The Value of Civilian Arms Possession As Deterrent To Crime Or Defense Against Crime By Don B. Kates Jr.* [selected portions and accompanying footnote] Difficulties and complexities of deterrent effects Though the evidence so far reviewed provides relatively strong support for the deterrent effect of civilian arms possession in the abstract, as to formulating concrete policy it raises almost as many questions as it resolves. Dramatic decreases in confrontation crime have followed in the wake of local programs dramatizing victim arms possession. [114A] But even leaving aside the issue of displacement, two questions suggest themselves: would such programs be legal and practicable if tried on a regional, state or anything beyond the purely local level; and, even if such programs did work in broader application, does their deterrent effect continue over time or is it merely transitory? [115] Related to, but transcending, these questions is the probative significance of such programs for the broader deterrent implications of an armed civilian population. The gun lobby cites the apparently dramatic effects of the Orlando and other local programs as proving that widespread gun ownership must reduce violent crime. Now at least unless one is a priori opposed to guns it will be intuitively evident that to grow up in an area where criminals are frequently shot by victims would at least tend to disincline people to confrontation offenses. But this intuition is only remotely supported by such local program results as the 90% reduction in Detroit grocery robberies when gun training for grocers led to the well publicized shootings of 7 armed robbers. [116] Perhaps hearing of 7 such deaths over a few weeks time has a shock effect on a fellow-robber that far exceeds the general deterrent effect of having heard of 25-30 such deaths over the entire period in which he grew up. Conversely, perhaps such a shock effect is only temporary; perhaps having grown up hearing of two or three such deaths each year would produce a greater deterrent effect on the prospective criminal's psyche over the long run. But "perhapses" are not evidence; or, rather, they are evidence of the numerous questions that remain after such evidence as exists is evaluated. * 115. The Kennesaw mandatory firearms ownership ordinance (which has been adopted by several other small towns) exempts conscientious objectors thereby avoiding not only possible constitutional problems but even the possibility of challenge at least in the federal courts since no opponent would have standing. But even a mandatory ownership law that did not exempt objectors would probably pass constitutional muster. From the earliest period of American settlement colonial and, subsequently, federal and state statutes imposed a duty to possess arms on virtually every household (and on every military age male in each such household) as both a defense against and a deterrent to attack by Indians, foreign powers and criminals alike. MICH. L. REV. n. 4 supra at 214-218. Based inter alia on this precedent the courts have invariably upheld the far more intrusive concept of a military draft fforall military age males with exemption for conscientious objectors being a matter of legislative grace. See e.g. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). But the decisive issue for a local or state program of deterring criminals through dramatizing victim gun ownership is publicity, not whether the victims actually have guns or even whether the criminals actually get shot thereby. In neither Orlando nor Kennesaw were any criminals actually shot; and the effect in Detroit was not caused by the criminals actually being shot but by the publicity this generated in light of the preceding denunciations of the grocer's association firearms training program by the police chief. Obviously no state or local agency could compel the media to carry stories dramatizing gun ownership. Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-258 (1974). But common sense and actual experience join in suggesting that public compulsion or sponsorship of programs designed to maximize civilian gun ownership are likely to generate controversy and consequent media attention. While that publicity might quickly abate, public officials would probably be able to revive it ad infinitum by tactics such as speeches praising the program, releases describing reported incidents of criminals being routed by victims or any reduction in violent crime that might be attributed to the program etc. This would require consistent allegiance to the concept by one or more law enforcement agencies (not necessarily the same agency) over a prolonged period, although strong opposition by other agencies and/or prominent persons or organizations might actually generate additional publicity. [continued in next message] ... The most common element in crime is CRIMINALS, not guns. --- Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 --- PCBoard (R) v15.22 (OS/2) 25 * Origin: OptiNet -->BBS Full LIVE Internet 204.214.208.240 (1:3606/10) 0SEEN-BY: 270/101 280/1 376/206 396/1 3615/50 51 3634/38 52 300 0PATH: 3606/10 396/1 3615/50 3634/38 From: Andy Kellett #0 @1:3606/10 via 1:3634/38 FIDOnet Re: Kennesaw Georgia 2/2 0AREA:RTKBA 0MSGID: 1:3606/10 00024566 2 of 2 Firearms and Violent Crime: Old Premises, Current Evidence* By Don B. Kates Jr.* [selected portions and accompanying footnote] "Criminals prefer unarmed victims" To reiterate, the preceding discussion concerns the actual use of guns to thwart crimes in progress. At first glance the evidence also supports the gun lobby's claim that widespread gun ownership deters the criminal from even attempting confrontation crimes. In 1982 the redneck Atlanta suburb, Kennesaw, became a laughingstock by requiring that a gun be kept in every household. But the joke redounded as the resulting publicity seemed to produce a virtual end to residential burglary which continues to this day. [36] Similar results appeared from a highly publicized 1966 program in which 3,000 civilian women received defensive handgun training from Orlando, Fl. police. As of 1967, rape had dropped 88.2% in Orlando and aggravated assault and burglary 25%. While rape gradually increased again after the year-long program ended, five years later the rate was still 13% below the pre-program level; during that same period rape had increased 64% nationally, 96.1% in Florida and over 300% in the immediate area around Orlando. [37] If every city adopted such programs to dramatize civilian gun ownership confrontation crime would drop (though not as much as in the examples described which probably involved some displacement of crime to the communities around Kennesaw and Orlando). In fact the experience in Orlando and Kennesaw is by no means unique; similar programs have produced similar results in Detroit, New Orleans and other cities. [37] But, as a practical matter, the controversiality of private gun ownership precludes such programs in most cities. That is apparently why the Orlando program lasted only one year. 36. Kleck and Bordua, note 10 above; New York Times, April 11, 1987 "Town Celebrates Mandatory Arms [Policy]." 37. Policy Lessons, note 22 above at 47. Note that the computations given in the text are my own based on FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1966 (pp. 85, 172), 1967 (pp. 11, 64) and 1971 (pp. 13, 64-68, 88, 199). Andy... akellett@mail.public.lib.ga.us ... Raise your hand if you support gun control: Seig Heil, Seig Heil.... --- Blue Wave/QWK v2.20 * Origin: OptiNet -->BBS Full LIVE Internet 204.214.208.240 (1:3606/10) 0SEEN-BY: 270/101 280/1 376/206 396/1 3615/50 51 3634/38 52 300 0PATH: 3606/10 396/1 3615/50 3634/38